The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20
Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine · 2014
05_Kaal.3d Pages:[1–60] Date:[November19,2014] Time:[15:55] The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance: Evidence from 1993–2013 By Wulf A. Kaal* and Timothy A. Lacine** Non-andDeferredProsecutionAgreements(N/DPAs)arecontroversialbecauseprosecu- tors,notjudgesorthelegislature,arechangingthegovernanceofleadingpubliccorpora- tions and entire industries. To analyze N/DPAs’ corporate governance implications and provide policy makers with guidance, we code all public
Cite: Wulf A. Kaal, Timothy Lacine, The Effect of Deferred and Non-Prosecution Agreements on Corporate Governance Evidence from 1993-20 (2014). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2486570. https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2486570
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