From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy
Wulf A. Kaal · 2026
—Artificial agents are becoming economic actors, performing open-ended cognitive work at a marginal cost that approaches zero. Neoclassical economics, built on scarce human labor allocated by price, does not describe this regime. This paper sets out the foundations of an alternative and argues that the alternative is empirically testable now. We distinguish the neoclassical labor force (NCLF) and neoclassical labor market (NCLM) from their computative counterparts, the computative labor force (CELF) and computative labor market (CELM), in which the binding coordination constraint is accumulated reputation rather than scarcity-driven price. From a synthesis of Arrow's impossibility theorem, the Folk Theorems of repeated games, and incomplete-contract theory, we restate a foundational result: any fixed governance rule set is eventually dominated, so coordination among autonomous agents requires institutions that govern their own evolution, with reputation as the operative signal. We then advance the methodological claim that motivates the paper. The distinction between neoclassical and computative labor is studiable today, because capable agents, on-chain coordination substrates, and reputation primitives already exist, and the competing predictions of the two accounts are falsifiable in controlled multi-agent settings. We situate the argument within a six- paper research arc that substantiates these foundations, and we state the propositions the arc evaluates. The governance mechanism and the empirical results are developed elsewhere in the arc and are deliberately outside the scope of this paper. Index Terms—Computative economics, agentic labor, reputation governance, neoclassical economics, blockchain, AI governance, multi-agent systems, decentralized organizations, mechanism design, recursive equilibrium. I. INTRODUCTION Artificial agents are no longer only tools. They are beginning to act as economic participants that originate, perform, and settle cognitive work
Cite: Wulf A. Kaal, From Neoclassical to Computative Labor: Foundations for a Testable Theory of Reputation Governance in the Agent Economy (2026). SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=6890879. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.6890879
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